Résumé
ABSTRACT Hierarchical Edge–Fog–Cloud infrastructures increasingly support distributed sensing, analytics, and collaborative computation over sensitive data. Their multi‐tier structure creates systems challenges for secure orchestration: resources are heterogeneous, communication costs vary sharply across layers, and trust assumptions are often bounded by administrative domains. This paper presents H‐SPDZ‐Cloud, a formal prototype for hierarchical authenticated secure multi‐party computation over Edge–Fog–Cloud architectures. The design organizes computation into cryptographically isolated levels, each using an independent message authentication code key, and introduces a verified inter‐level resharing mechanism that keeps secrets in shared form during normal‐case upward transitions. The prototype also includes localized fault handling under a per‐level honest‐majority assumption suited to bounded hierarchical deployments. The H‐SPDZ‐Cloud prototype is evaluated in a controlled single‐host reproducibility testbed configured with the 127‐bit Mersenne prime field , represented using 16‐byte field‐element encodings. Prototype measurements show communication‐locality behavior relative to an internal flat SPDZ‐style Python baseline, with a 31.4% reduction in measured online communication and a 42.4% reduction in total communication for the tested workload. The prototype also evaluates secure fixed‐point inference on the public Wisconsin Diagnostic Breast Cancer dataset, with secret‐shared test features and 100% agreement between the secure and quantized plaintext predictions on the secured subset. The implemented 127‐bit‐prime‐field pipeline uses fixed‐base precomputation for the BN254/Pedersen transition evidence, the corrected masked batch MAC check, and a prototype Sigma/Schnorr dispute‐proof fallback, yielding a measured local‐pipeline latency of 696.2 ms and an fault‐localization latency of 3066.8 ms as reproducible prototype timings. TCP validation with independent party servers further exercises socket serialization and process‐isolated Edge/Fog transition workers; a subsequent authenticated multi‐region three‐VPS validation executes the external‐endpoint path from an independent Cloud controller to Edge and Fog VPS workers over TLS 1.3, reporting 229.2 ms mean TCP/TLS latency, 93.5 ms transition‐fault detection with 30/30 detections, and 264.3 ms/sample secure‐inference latency. A separate local MP‐SPDZ MASCOT reference execution confirms that the three reference arithmetic workloads also run in a standard MPC framework, while H‐SPDZ‐Cloud measurements use the Python prototype pipeline. The manuscript implements and measures an optimistic verification and pessimistic privacy‐preserving dispute path, with plaintext audit opening reserved for a separate administrative debug mode.